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Abstract
Most randomized controlled trials require the collaboration of field partners.
Such self-selection could introduce a potential bias, because only the most optimistic
may participate. We revisit this prediction. We argue that in many situations, the
experimental intervention is competing with alternative interventions participants
could conduct themselves outside the experiment. Since participants have a chance
of being assigned to the control group, participating has a direct opportunity cost,
which is likely to be higher for optimists. We propose a model of self-selection and
show that both pessimists and optimists may opt out of the experiment, leading to
an ambiguous selection bias.
Keywords: Field experiments, selection bias, randomised controlled trials, external valid-
ity
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a booming increase in popularity of field experiments in eco-
nomics and social sciences (Holt, 2005) and there is now a stronghold of researchers ad-
vocating the case for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to overcome the challenges of
endogeneity plaguing empirical work (Burtless, 1995, Duflo and Kremer, 2005). One key
issue though with such experiments is the issue of external validity, specifically, we would
like to know if we can generalize the lessons we draw from such experiments to the wider
population of interest.1 The answer to this question depends on the representativeness
of the sample along characteristics that may be correlated with the estimated treatment
effects. In that context, self-selection deserves prime attention. In almost all randomized
1A number of recent papers study self-selection in field experiments: Allcott and Mullainathan (2012),
Belot and James (2013), Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012)
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controlled experiments in social sciences, participation is voluntary. Often RCTs require
the collaboration of field practitionners such as job agencies, schools, firms or charities
who are prepared to collaborate with researchers and provide the necessary support for
data collection. On top of that, the population to be treated (job seekers, pupils, employ-
ees or donors for example) often also has the right to opt out from participating to the
experiment.2
Researchers are well aware of the implications of self-selection for external validity.
The standard prediction in the literature on selection in randomised field experiments is a
positive selection bias, following the spirit of the literature on policy evaluation (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2006 and Heckman et al.,1999). List and Rasul (2011) state in a recent
review paper on ”Field Experiments in Labor Economics” that ”Indeed, in almost any
social experiment related to job training programs, it is a concern that those most likely
to benefit from the program select into the program.”
We argue that this prediction is not necessarily correct because participating to the
experiment does not guarantee treatment and entails a chance of ending up in the control
group. Being assigned to the control group often entails an opportunity cost, in the
sense that participants are often required not to conduct any competing intervention
(and certainly not the experimental intervention itself) at the same time. Almost all
RCTs (in medical and social sciences) entail such opportunity cost. Our own experiment
(Belot et al. (2013)) provides an example. We study the process of selection of schools in
a randomized controlled experiment aimed at testing the effects of two incentive schemes
(a piece rate and a competition) to encourage children to eat more fruit and vegetables.
We assigned schools to either of the two incentives or to a control group, which would
not implement any incentive scheme over the course of the experiment. We approached
schools and explained the randomization procedure. It turned out that some schools
explicitly asked whether they could be in the treatment group (which of course we did
not allow) and a number of schools who opted out explicitly mentioned to us that they
preferred not to participate because they were already involved in similar programmes.
Their decision not to participate could therefore introduce a negative selection bias as
well. Similarly, a recent study by Fryer (2011) tests the effects of incentives in schools
2Many Ethical Review Boards require explicit informed consent from participants to experiments. This
means that participants must be told in advance what treatment is tested and how the randomisation
will take place.
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and randomize schools into various types of incentive schemes. The schools in the control
group did not implement any incentive scheme over the course of the study.
This paper re-visits the issue of self-selection in randomized field experiments. We
present a simple model of self-selection allowing for the presence of competing inter-
ventions. Potential partners self-select based on a prior about the effectiveness of the
intervention. We introduce two specific features in the model, likely to be relevant for
field experiments in social sciences: First, participating to a randomized controlled trial
entails a probability of not receiving the treatment. Second, the alternative to participat-
ing is to conduct an intervention competing with the intervention to be tested with the
RCT. Thus, being in the control group entails an opportunity cost and is not necessarily
equivalent to not participating to the experiment. Those who choose not to participate
could conduct interventions that are (1) similar to the intervention proposed (e.g. an
incentive scheme) and/or (2) directly competing with the intervention proposed, in the
sense that both cannot be implemented at the same time (such as again in the example
of a specific incentive scheme).
In many situations, the intervention to be tested already exists and the main goal of
the RCT is to establish causality. The key reason why causality is difficult to establish
is because of self-selection: Those who are already exposed to the treatment are not a
random sample of the population and are likely to be those who benefit most from the
treatment. In fact, researchers often look for ”virgin samples”, i.e. participants who have
not yet been exposed to the treatment. Or, alternatively, participants themselves will
not see the point of participating if they are already implementing the intervention. For
example, a firm that implements a tournament incentive scheme may not be interested
in testing the effects of a tournament, particularly if it means there is a chance they may
have to give it up temporarily (or have a smaller proportion of their workers exposed
to the tournament scheme) if the end up in the control group. Of course this obviously
introduces a selection bias which, suprisingly, has received little attention in the literature.
In order to illustrate this point, we provide in Appendix A a brief overview of the infor-
mation provided in field experimental studies published over the last five years in the top
5 journals and in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. We focus on the
fields of policy evaluation, personnel economics and development economics, which have
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all experienced a significant increase in the popularity of field experimental research.3 In
most cases the experimental interventions cannot be considered as completely innovative,
i.e. they are not interventions that participants could not have considered themselves
before, and an opportunity cost is likely to be present. Typically the samples used had
not been treated before, although in some cases this was not alluded to or it was not clear.
Thus, the typical experiment tests an intervention that is plausibly accessible outside the
experiment. Or at least similar interventions are accessible to the potential participants.
As we will see, this has important implications for the prediction of the direction of the
bias.
Our work relates most to Malani’s work (2008) on self-selection in medical randomised
controlled trials. His model resembles the one presented here, to the extent that partici-
pants self-select into the experiment based on a prior about the effectiveness of the treat-
ment. He assumes that patients have a choice between an old treatment and participating
to a randomised controlled trial (RCT) involving a new treatment. As the probability of
being assigned to the treatment group in the RCT increases, less optimistic patients are
willing to participate to the RCT. If the probability is lower than 1 (which will always be
the case by definition in a RCT), only the most optimistic will be willing to experiment
and we will obtain a positive selection bias. The main difference with our model is that
we allow for a possible positive correlation in effectiveness between the experimental in-
tervention and the alternative intervention that participants could implement outside the
experiment. In fact, it could even be that the experimental intervention itself is directly
available to the participants outside the experiment. This contrasts sharply with medical
trials, where the new treatment to be tested in not available to the participants outside
the RCT.
The question of selection bias also has a specific angle in a policy relevant context.
Policymakers may not be interested in the average treatment effect calculated over the
entire population. Instead, they may be interested in knowing whether the intervention
is worth subsidizing, whether it is sufficiently effective for those who are “on the margin”
and would not conduct it without subsidy. We find in that case, it is possible to sign the
selection bias if one carefully documents the costs of experimentation beforehand.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model
3We searched these journals systematically for the keywords ‘field’ and ‘experiment’.
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of selection. Section 4 discusses the nature of the bias for the policy-relevant treatment
effect. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The goal of an experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular intervention on
an outcome of interest and within a population of interest. The objective of this section is
to present a simple model that sheds light on the nature of selection in such environments.
2.1 The traditional problem of selection bias
Researchers are interested in estimating the causal effect of a treatment on an outcome
of interest. Suppose we are interested in the average treatment effect, i.e. that is the
treatment effect averaged over the population of interest. For example, in Belot et al.
(2013), we are interested in testing whether providing incentives can encourage children
to develop healthier diet habits. Let us define y as the outcome of the intervention (for
example, the number of fruit and vegetables consumed in a week).
Suppose the researcher is interested in testing the effectiveness of a specific treat-
ment/intervention, say TA, with TA = 0 if the individual is not treated and TA = 1 if the
individual is treated. The level y achieved by individual i is a function of the treatment:
yi(TAi) = β0i + βAiTAi + ui, (1)
where β0i and βAi are unknown parameters and ui is an individual specific error term.
Obviously there is an issue of selection bias only if there is heterogeneity in the effec-
tiveness of an intervention across individuals (βAi are individual specific) in a way that
cannot be fully controlled for (i.e. there are conditional on unobservable characteristics
of the population). In general terms βAi is a function of observable and unobservable
characteristics Xi : βAi = g(Xi, ui).
Let us ignore for now the possibility of conducting an RCT. If the intervention was
available to everyone, the decision to conduct the intervention would depend on the ex-
pected marginal benefit of the intervention. More precisely, suppose individuals have a
prior β∗Ai regarding the effectiveness of treatment A. β
∗
Ai is a draw from a distribution
F (βAi),and assume that E(β
∗
Ai) = βAi (without loss of generality)
4 and defined on the
4Note that the argument carries through even if priors are systematically biased upwards or down-
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support [βA,min, βA,max]. Suppose conducting the intervention has a fixed cost cA that we
assume identical across individuals.
The expected net benefit of conducting the intervention is β∗Ai − cA. Only those
with β∗Ai > cA will conduct the intervention. This type of selection corresponds to the
”traditional” selection bias usually considered in the policy evaluation literature. Those
who would implement the treatment are those with the highest expected marginal benefits
of the treatment. Given that priors are correlated with the truth, the estimated average
treatment effect β̂A will be a positively biased estimate of βA.
2.2 Randomized-Controlled Experiments
2.2.1 Unbiased estimate
The main point of an RCT is to get rid of the selection problem described above. Sup-
pose the researcher is interested in estimating βA (the average treatment effect across all
individuals). An unbiased estimate of βAwould be obtained by a randomised controlled
trial, with a group of NTreat individuals assigned at random to a treatment group (who
receive treatment A) and a group of NControl individuals assigned at random to a control
group (who do not receive the treatment). The key assumption to obtained an unbiased
estimate of βA is E(TAi|ui) = 0, that is the assignment to treatment and control is random
and is uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics. In that case:
β̂A =
∑
i∈Treatment yi
NTreat
−
∑
i∈Control yi
NControl
(2)
= yTreat − yControl
2.2.2 Outside Option and Competing interventions
We now discuss the issue of self-selection in a world where possible competing and similar
interventions may exist. For simplicity and without loss of generality, let us assume there
is one possible alternative intervention TB.
Definition 1. Intervention TB is said to be competing with the experimental interven-
tion TA if it cannot be (practically) implemented in conjunction with the experimental
intervention.
For example, the firm that implements a tournament cannot implement a piece-rate
for the same workers.
wards.
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Definition 2. Intervention TB is said to be similar to the intervention TA if the prior
beliefs of the treatment effects of interventions TA and TB (β
∗
Ai
, β∗Bi) are positively corre-
lated.
For example, schools could implement various interventions to increase fruit and veg-
etable consumption, and could hold positively correlated beliefs regarding the effectiveness
of these interventions.
A special case is if TA itself is available outside the experimental setting.
An important question is what does participating in the experiment imply for the
participants. Specifically, what can the control group do? What interventions can they
implement? And how does this compare to what non-participants can do?
In principle, those in the control group are not treated and may be involved in other
interventions. There are two typical cases. First, participants in the control group are
told not to implement TA or any other treatment that is both competing and similar to
TA. Second, which is typical in medical trials, the control group can continue to take the
current best treatment that is available (TB), but will not have access to TA. If that is
the case, then the estimated effect will only capture the net difference between the effect
of the experimental intervention and the effect of alternative competing interventions. In
contrast, non-participants can always implement TB or even TA if it is available to them.
2.2.3 Participation Decision and Selection Bias
In this section we will derive the participation constraints for the two cases described
above. We consider first the situation where E(β∗A) ≥ E(β∗B) and E(β∗A) ≥ 0, that is, the
experimental intervention is a priori believed to be more effective than the interventions
that are currently available, and TA is believed to have a positive effect.
Presumably there is a direct cost of participating to the experiment, which we denote
k (such as providing support for data collection, etc.) but also a potential subsidy s. Also,
implementing intervention TB has a cost cB (assumed identifical for all individuals).
Denote g¯ = pi(streat − k − cA) + (1− pi)(scontrol − k).
Case 1 Intervention TB is not available to the control group.
Then the decision to participate to the experiment must satisfy:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}, (3)
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where β∗Bi is i’s prior belief about the effectiveness of TB.
We now derive the participation constraints. We first start with the optimists (such
that β∗Bi ≥ cB). The decision to participate to the experiment satisfies:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ β∗Bi − cB if β∗Bi ≥ cB (4)
⇔
β∗Bi ≤ piβ∗Ai + g¯ + cB if β∗Bi ≥ cB (5)
Without loss of generality, let us take the example where β∗Bi is a linear projection of
β∗Ai, i.e. β
∗
Bi = ρβ
∗
Ai + ηi, with ρ being a fixed parameter and ηi an error term, with mean
zero and variance σ2η. We can then write condition [4] as:
(ρ− pi)β∗Ai ≤ g¯ + cB − ηi if β∗Bi ≥ cB (6)
If ρ > pi :
β∗Ai ≤
g¯ + cB − ηi
(ρ− pi) if β
∗
Bi ≥ cB (7)
If ρ > pi, then there will be a negative selection bias. All else equal, the higher the
correlation between TA and TB the more negative selection there is.
If ρ < pi, then positive selection could take place:
β∗Ai ≥
g¯ + cB − ηi
(ρ− pi) if β
∗
Bi ≥ cB (8)
In contrast, the participation constraint for pessimists (those such that β∗Bi < cB)
satisfies:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi < cB (9)
⇔ (10)
β∗Ai ≥ −
g¯
pi
(11)
These two conditions show that positive and negative selection can take place at the
same time. Without further assumptions on the distribution and joint distribution of β∗Ai
and β∗Bi, we cannot draw conlusions on the direction of the bias.
Case 2 Intervention TB is available to the control group.
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This second case corresponds to Malani’s model and implies a lower implicit cost of
participating to the experiment. But more importantly, the implications for selection are
very different.
Here the decision to participate to the experiment must satisfy:
piβ∗Ai + (1− pi)max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}+ g¯ ≥ max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}, (12)
piβ∗Ai + (1− pi)(β∗Bi − cB) + g¯ ≥ β∗Bi − cB if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (13)
pi(β∗Ai − β∗Bi + cB) + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (14)
pi(β∗Ai − β∗Bi) ≥ −cB − g¯ if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (15)
If β∗Ai > β
∗
Bi, which we have assumed is true in expectations, then those who are
optimistic about A will opt in, then the constraint is always satisfied if cB + g¯ > 0, which
is likely to be the case in a typical randomised controlled experiment. In that case, no
negative selection takes place.
However, if the non participants have access to TA, while the control group does not
(and only has access to TB), then the participation condition becomes:
piβ∗Ai + (1− pi)(β∗Bi − cB) + g¯ ≥ β∗Ai − cA if β∗Ai − cA ≥ β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0
β∗Ai ≤
cA + g¯
(1− pi) + (β
∗
Bi − cB)
(1− ρ)β∗Ai ≤
cA + g¯
(1− pi) − cB + ηi,
such that the most optimistic will select out to implement TA outside the experiment.
There could still be positive selection in the case where B is not attractive to non
participants or participants in the control group.
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi − cB < 0,
β∗Ai ≥ −
g¯
pi
if β∗Bi − cB < 0.
3 Selection bias and policy-relevant average treat-
ment effect estimate
While researchers may be interested in estimating the value of βA defined over the en-
tire population, policy makers may not be interested in that parameter. Instead, they
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may be more interested in what we will call a ”policy-relevant average treatment effect”
(PRATE)5. We now define the PRATE and discuss the implications of selection.
Suppose a policy maker considers implementing an intervention at a given point in
time. Suppose the social optimum is such that it is beneficial to implement the inter-
vention if βAi ≥ cA − e, where e is a positive externality on society, which we assume is
known. Think for example of the reduced costs of health care associated with a healthy
diet.
Suppose the policy maker would like to identify the average effect on the population
for which the intervention is socially optimal but not privately optimal. In that case, the
experiment would ideally participate to the experiment excludes (1) those with βAi ≥ cA,
who would implement the intervention without public intervention, (2) those for whom
βAi < cA− e. We will refer to the population corresponding to this interval [cA− e, cA] as
the ”target” population.
Since the distribution of treatment effects is unknown, the goal of a policy experiment
is to obtain an estimate of the average treatment effect in the target population. Of course
an alternative could be to simply elicit beliefs from the population. But this alternative is
unlikely to be implementable with compatible incentives and, moreover, beliefs are noisy
and the goal of an RCT could be to obtain more precise estimates of the treatment effects.
Suppose the intervention is assessed according to its average costs and benefits and
is judged worthwhile if the average benefits are higher than the average costs in the
target population. Then the Policy Relevant Average Treatment Effect corresponds to
the treatment effect estimated for the target population.
If that is the case and if beliefs are not systematically biased, then the experimental
sample that would provide an unbiased estimate of this average policy relevant treatment
effect is defined on that same interval.
Definition 3. The policy relevant average treatment effect βP is defined as βP =
∫ cI
cI−e βAidF (βAi)
Thus at the top of the distribution, the experimental sample should include those such
that β∗Ai ≤ cA and those such that β∗Ai ≥ cA − e.
The question is whether it is possible to choose a subsidy level that would lead to
the appropriate self-selection, that is, a level of subsidy such that only individuals in the
5Note that our concept of PRATE is different from the policy relevant treatment effect discussed in
Heckman, J.J. and E. Vytlacil (2001)
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target population would self-select.
For simplicity, we focus on the most interesting and simple case where TA is available
outside the experiment, TA is more attractive than TB and TB is not available to the
control group. Policy makers (or experimental researchers) can choose freely a level of
subsidy that will compensate the participants both in the control and treatment groups.
Let us denote s = pistreat + (1− pi)scontrol
There are two parameters the experiment can control: pi and s.
piβ∗Ai + s− k − picA ≥ max{β∗Ai − cA, 0} (16)
⇔
β∗Ai ≤ cA +
s− k
(1− pi) if β
∗
Ai ≥ cA (17)
β∗Ai ≥ cA −
s− k
pi
if β∗Ai < cA (18)
To ensure that the relevant experimental sample participates (defined on the interval
[cA − e, cA]), the following conditions must be satisfied
s− k
(1− pi) = 0
s− k
pi
= e
It is obvious that there exists no combintion of pi and s that could achieve this support.
In fact, as soon as the expected subsidy s > k, then both types of selection take place at
the same time. As soon as the average subsidy covers more than the experimental costs
k, the experimental sample will for sure include participants for which the intervention is
privately desirable (i.e. such that β∗Ai ≥ cA).
But if s−k
pi
≤ e, then we now for sure that the experimental sample will not include
participants for whom the intervention is neither privately nor socially desirable. That is,
we now for sure that the PRATE will be biased up upwards.
11
4 Conclusion
This paper discusses the implications of self-selection into randomised controlled field
experiments. We point out that in many situations, alternatives to the experimental
intervention (or the intervention itself) are available outside the experiment. The impli-
cation is that being part of the control group entails an opportunity cost, which could
lead to both positive and negative selection at the same time.
We also discuss the potential bias in what we call the ”policy-relevant treatment
effect”, which corresponds to the treatment effect for those individuals for whom the
treatment is socially efficient. We derive conditions under which the bias can be signed
and, more specifically, is unambiguously positive.
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Paper
Documentation
of partner
selection
Comparison
with broader
sample
Similar &
competing
interventions
available
Virgin
sample
Innovative
intervention
Fryer, QJE (2011)
Partner: 200 schools across three cities in the US
Intervention: Provision of incentives to school
children (on school inputs and outputs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hastings and Weinstein, QJE (2008)
Partner: Charlotte Mecklenburg Public School Distict
Intervention: Provision of information about
school outcomes to parents
No No Yes
Yes (cohort)
No (school)
No
Wisdom, Downs, and Loewenstein, AEJ:Applied (2010)
Partner: Fast Food Sandwich Chain
Intervention: Provision of nutritional information
No No Yes Yes No
Dupas, AEJ:Applied (2011)
Partner: two rural districts of Western Kenya,
involving 328 primary schools
Intervention: Provision of HIV risk information to teenagers
No No Yes Unclear No
Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, AER (2011)
Partner: Schools in Kenya
Intervention: Tracking in schools
No No Yes Yes No
Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, AER (2011)
Partner: Four schools in Chitwan District, Nepal
Intervention: Providing sanitary products on school attendance
No No Yes Unclear No
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, QJE (2007)
Partner: fruit picking farm
Goal: Test the effectiveness of worker’s pay incentive scheme
No No Yes Yes No
Fehr and and Goette, AER (2007)
Partner: Bicycle Messenger Service
Goal: Testing labour supply responses
to transitory wage changes
No No Yes Yes No
15
